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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In 2003, Raymond Melton was convicted and sentenced for lewd conduct with a 
child under the age of sixteen. His sentence was affirmed on direct appeal in 2004. 
Also in 2004, Mr. Melton filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting 
numerous claims for relief, including certain claims related to his assertion that his minor 
victim's preliminary hearing testimony and other statements had been coerced and 
coached by the State. Mr. Melton was appointed counsel and provided an evidentiary 
hearing; however, his post-conviction counsel failed to offer adequate evidence (such 
as the testimony of the victim, her mother, or any of the persons who were involved in 
coercinglcoaching her testimony) at the evidentiary hearing to allow Mr. Melton to 
prevail on his coercion/coaching-related claims. 
In 2006, just months after his first post-conviction case was finally resolved, 
Mr. Meiton filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief and again requested the 
appointment of counsel. In his successive petition, Mr. Melton reiterated his claims 
regarding the State's coercion/coaching of his victim and asserted that his successive 
petition was properly filed because his post-conviction counsel had inadequately 
asserted those claims in his first post-conviction case. He supported his successive 
petition not only with his own affidavit, but with two letters from his victim stating that 
she had lied at the behest of the State. and that she had done so because of the 
harassment and intimidation of the prosecutor and other members of the prosecution 
team. 
Without addressing Mr. Melton's motion for appointment of counsel, the district 
court summarily dismissed Mr. Melton's successive petition. Mr. Melton then initiated 
the present appeal. 
On Appeal, Mr. Melton contends that the district court erred in two respects: first, 
the district court erred in failing to grant, or even rule upon, his motion for appointment 
of counsel before summarily dismissing his successive petition; second, the district 
court erred in summarily dismissing his successive petition. Mr. Melton contends that 
these errors necessitate a remand of his case to the district court for appointment of 
counsel and an evidentiary hearing on his claims. 
In response, the State addresses Mr. Melton's second claim first, arguing that 
summary dismissal of Mr. Melton's successive petition was proper because: (A) the 
successive petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata (Respondent's Brief, pp.7- 
11); (B) the successive petition was really a thinly disguised motion for a new trial and, 
thus, was untimely and without an adequate legal basis (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-13); 
(C) Mr. Melton had no legal basis to file a successive petition ineffective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel at an earlier evidentiary hearing is not a "sufficient reason" to 
file a successive petition under I.C. 3 19-4908 (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-17); (D) 
Mr. Melton's successive petition was untimely because it was not filed within a year of 
completion of his direct appeal (Respondent's Brief, pp.18-19); and (E) Mr. Melton's 
petition did not raise a genuine issue of material fact with regard to an issue which, if 
resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief (Respondent's brief, pp.19-23). 
With regard to Mr. Melton's first claim, the State refers back to its previous arguments 
about why it believes Mr. Melton's successive petition was meritless and argues that 
either "there was no basis for appointment of counsel in his case" and, thus, the failure 
to rule on the motion prior to summary dismissal was harmless. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.23-26.) 
The present Reply is necessary to respond briefly to some of the State's 
arguments. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedincls 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in 
Mr. Melton's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, need not be repeated herein. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in failing to grant, or even rule upon, Mr. Melton's motion 
for appointment of counsel before summarily dismissing his successive petition 
for post-conviction relief? 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Melton's successive petition 
for post-conviction relief? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Failing To Carefullv Consider, And Grant, Mr. Melton's 
Motion For Appointment Of Counsel 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Melton argued that the district court erred in two 
respects when it failed to rule on his motion for appointment of counsel (thereby 
effectively denying that motion) before summarily dismissing his successive petition for 
post-conviction relief. He argued first that the district court's failure to even rule on his 
motion for appointment of counsel constituted error under Charboneau v. Stafe, 140 
ldaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004). (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19.) Next, he argued that 
under Charboneau and Swader v. Stafe, 143 ldaho 651, 152 P.3d 12 (2007), the 
effective denial of that motion was erroneous because he had raised the possibility of a 
valid claim. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20.) 
In response, the State argues that Mr. Melton's successive petition was meritless 
and, therefore, "there was no basis for appointment of counsel in his case" and the 
district court's failure to rule on the motion prior to summary dismissal was harmless. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.23-26.) 
Because the State's claim that Mr. Melton's successive petition was meritless is 
thoroughly refuted in Mr. Melton's Appellant's Brief, and in Part 11, below, no further 
reply is necessary 
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissina Mr. Melton's Successive Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief 
As noted, the State offers a host of reasons why it believes that Mr. Melton's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief was meritless and, thus, was properly 
summarily dismissed by the district court. Most of the State's arguments are adequately 
addressed in Mr. Melton's opening brief (see Appellant's Brief, pp.21-34); however, 
some of the State's contentions require additional discussion. That discussion is 
provided below. 
A. The Doctrine Of Res Judicata Did Not Bar The Claims Presented In Mr. Melton's 
Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Melton, citing I.C. § 19-4908, Griffin v. State, 142 
Idaho 438, 128 P.3d 975 (Ct. App. 2006), and a number of other cases, argued that 
there is no per se rule against re-litigating previously-considered post-conviction claims, 
and that such claims can be re-raised in a successive petition for post-conviction relief if 
there is a "sufficient reason" why those claims were inadequately presented in the first 
post-conviction case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-25 & n.21.) In response, the State 
argues that Mr. Melton is wrong, and that, in fact, all previously-litigated post-conviction 
claims are res judicata, and thus off-limits for a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-1 I .) This argument, however, is specious. 
First, if res judicafa were to apply to inadequately presented post-conviction 
claims, a portion of I.C. § 19-4908 ("unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted 
which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application"), and the cases interpreting that language 
holding that a "sufficient reason" includes the ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel (such as Griffin), would be nullified. 
Second, although the State finds it compelling that "Griffin does not discuss the 
doctrine of resjudicafa, let alone any exceptions to it," apparently believing that this lack 
of discussion of res judicata is a basis for distinguishing that case from this one, the 
State overlooks the fact that the reason Griffin does not discuss the res judicata doctrine 
is because it is so clearly inapplicable in the present case. 
Third, to the extent that the State attempts to distinguish Griffin on its facts, that 
attempt is unpersuasive. It is true that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel 
complained of in Griffin arose prior to an evidentiary hearing, whereas the 
ineffectiveness complained of in this case arose at the evidentiary hearing. However, 
that is a distinction without a difference because the res judicafa doctrine, which holds 
that "a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out 
of the same transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose," 
Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 ldaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990), makes 
no distinction between final judgments that come about by means of summary judgment 
and those that come about following trial. In other words, because a final decision as to 
the factual contentions of the parties is not a prerequisite to application of the res 
judicata doctrine, see Duthie v. Lewisfon Gun Club, 104 ldaho 751, 753-54, 663 P.2d 
287, 289-90 (1983) ("[Rles judicata applies to every matter which might and should 
have been litigated in the first suit whether or not it was raised in the pleadings."), the 
State's attempt to say that the res judicata applies precisely because Mr. Melton's 
factual contentions were addressed by the district court finds no basis in the law. The 
bottom line is that res judicata has been pre-empted by I.C. § 19-4908 in post-conviction 
cases. 
B. Mr. Melton's Successive Petition Was Correctlv Styled A Successive Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief 
Another argument presented by the State is that Mr. Melton's successive petition 
was really a thinly disguised motion for a new trial and, thus, was untimely and without 
an adequate legal basis. (Respondent's Brief, pp.ll-13.) This, however, is nothing but 
a "straw man" argument. 
The State argues, in wholly conclusory fashion, that the substance of 
Mr. Meiton's successive petition was really a request for a new trial under Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure 59(a) andlor 60(b). (Respondent's Brief, p.1 I . )  After making that 
bald assertion, the State then offers the myriad of reasons why it believes Mr. Melton's 
petition would fail under those rules (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-13), not the least of 
which is that Mr. Melton's claims are not cognizable under either Rule 59(a) or 60(b) 
(Respodent's Brief, p.12). 
The fundamental problem with the State's argument, of course, is that 
Mr. Melton's successive petition clearly was not brought pursuant to Rules 59(a) or 
60(b); it was properly brought pursuant to I.C. 3 19-4908. Moreover, the State's attempt 
to claim otherwise is illogical given that, if we assume that the claims raised in 
Mr. Melton's successive petition are not cognizable under Rules 59(a) and 60(b), then 
there is no basis for the State to argue that, despite the styling of Mr. Melton's 
successive petition, the substance of that petition is really a motion for a new trial. 
Although the State has done a fine job job knocking down its "straw man," 
Mr. Melton asks this Court to disregard that argument entirely, as it has nothing 
whatsoever to do with this case. 
C. Ineffective Assistance Of Post-Conviction Counsel Is A "Sufficient Reason" To 
File A Successive Petition Under I.C. 6 19-4908 
The State also attempts to argue that Mr. Melton's successive petition is barred 
because: 
there are only two instances in which ineffective assistance of prior post- 
conviction counsel might constitute 'sufficient reason' for permitting the 
petitioner to file a claim in a successive petition: (1) where a claim raised 
in the original pro se petition was omitted from the amended petition filed 
by court-appointed counsel without the petitioner's knowledge or consent, 
or (2) where the petitioner's unadjudicated claim was lost or forfeited due 
to counsel's failure to respond to the district court's notice of intent to 
dismiss. . . . 
(Respondent's Brief, p.17 (citation omitted).) This, however, is an overly narrow view of 
I.C. § 19-4908. 
While the State may very well be correct in its assertion that "[nlo case 
interpreting I.C. 19-4908 has permitted a petitioner to have a new post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing based upon a claim that the attorney failed to present enough 
evidence at the fist post-conviction evidentiary" (Respondent's Brief, p.17), such a lack 
of published decisions does not mean that I.C. § 19-4908 cannot be read to allow 
successive petitions based on the ineffective assistance provided at a prior evidentiary 
hearing. Indeed, section 19-4908 is couched in relatively broad terms, speaking of a 
"sufficient reason" why a ground for relief was "inadequately raised," I.C. $j 19-4908, and 
the State offers no principled reason why this broad language should be given such an 
artificially restrictive construction. Moreover, in Palmer v. Dermiff, 102 Idaho 591, 596, 
635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981), one of the cases relied upon by the State for its argument on 
this point, the ldaho Supreme Court cited, with approval, to Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d 
420, 422-23 (lowa 1980), a case in which the lowa Supreme Court implicitly recognized 
(but considering petitioner's claims on their merits) that ineffective assistance of post- 
conviction counsel at an evidentiary hearing is a "sufficient reason" for "inadequately 
raising" an issue and, thus, justifies the filing of a successive petition.' Thus, the best 
interpretation of I.C. § 19-4908 and Palmer is that any ineffective assistance of post- 
conviction counsel-regardless of whether it occurs prior to the evidentiary hearing or at 
the evidentiary hearing-is a "sufficient reason" justifying a successive petition. 
D. Mr. Melton's Successive Petition Was Timelv Filed 
Another argument raised by the State is that Mr. Melton's successive petition 
was untimely because it was not filed within a year of completion of his direct appeal. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 18-1 9.) This argument is also without merit. 
Although the State cites Hernandez v. State, 133 ldaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 
(Ct. App. 1999), it fails to recognize that that case refutes its argument. In Hernandez, 
the Court of Appeals adopted a "relation-back doctrine for successive petitions and 
held "that one year is a reasonable time for an inmate in these circumstances to 
proceed with a successive post-conviction relief action if the initial action was dismissed 
due to the ineffective assistance from the attorney representing the inmate in that 
proceeding." Hernandez, 133 ldaho at 794, 992 P.2d at 799. It further held that, 
because the petitioner had filed his successive petition less than a year after the 
' lowa has also adopted the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. See IOWA CODE 
ANN. §§ 822.1 through .11. Accordingly, Iowa's statute governing successive petitions 
is virtually identical to Idaho's. Compare I.C. 3 19-4908 with IOWA CODEANN. § 822.8. 
10 
disposition of the appeal of the first post-conviction case, the successive petition was 
not time-barred. Id.; see also Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870, 
875 (2007) (holding that successive petitions in non-capital cases must be filed within a 
"reasonable time" of the petitioner's becoming aware of his claim, and that thirteen 
months was not reasonable under the facts of that case). 
With regard to Mr. Melton's situation, the Remittitur in his first post-conviction 
appeal was issued on March 22, 2006 (R., p.75), and he filed his successive petition 
(and the memorandum in support thereof) just over a month later, on April 24, 2006 
(R,  I - 1 1  Accordingly, his successive petition was filed in a "reasonable time" and 
was, therefore, timely. 
E. Mr. Melton's Successive Petition Raised Genuine Issues Of Material Fact 
Finally, the State contends that Mr. Melton's successive petition was properly 
summarily dismissed because it did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to an 
issue which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.19-23.) This argument, however, because it is based on the State's 
misinterpretation of applicable standards, and a lot of fanciful speculation, is also 
without merit. 
First, while the State correctly observes that Mr. Melton did not support his 
successive petition with affidavits from the individuals who could have testified at his 
evidentiary hearing about the prosecutor's coercion and coaching of C.M.'s testimony 
(C.M. herself, Tammy Blevins, Alisa Moon, Ron Gear, and Phillip Brown), this is not a 
deficiency which should have warranted summary dismissal since, when he filed his 
successive petition, Mr. Melton was in a situation where obtaining those affidavits would 
have been virtually impossible. Not only was he incarcerated (R., p.l), but he was also 
under an order not to have any contact with either C.M. or Ms. Blevins (Melton I, Sent. 
Tr., p.59, Ls.11-16). Moreover, as noted, his motion for appointment of counsel had 
been ignored by the district court. As the ldaho Supreme Court has recently noted, 
"[aln indigent defendant who is incarcerated in the penitentiary would almost certainly 
be unable to conduct an investigation into facts not already contained in the court 
record." Swader v. State, 143 ldaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d f2, 15 (2007). 
Second, the State asserts that "it must be presumed that prior post-conviction 
counsel concluded that calling C.M. and her mother [Tammy Blevins] would have been 
fruitless." (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) However, that argument represents a gross 
misstatement of the law. In fact, at the summary dismissal stage, all of Mr. Melton's 
allegations should have been taken as true, and all reasonable inferences should have 
been drawn in his favor. Small v. Sfafe, 132 ldaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 
(Ct. App. 1998). 
Third, while the State speculates that post-conviction counsel "did not call the 
alleged witnesses because they would not support" Mr. Melton's claims (Respondent's 
Brief, p.21), that is precisely the type of inference that the district court was not 
permitted to draw in weighing the summary dismissal question. See id. Likewise, while 
the State opines that "[plrior post-conviction counsel would have been justified in 
determining that calling C.M., Tammy Blevins, Alisa Moon, Ron Gear, and Phillip Brown 
as witnesses at the evidentiary hearing in Melton's prior post-conviction case was 
irrelevant followings Melton's admission that his daughter's statement . . . was true" 
(Respondent's Brief, p.22), there is no evidence to support the inference that that was 
post-conviction counsel's thought process and, thus, such an inference was 
impermissible. See Small, 132 Idaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155. 
Fourth, the State is incorrect when it asserts that letters, written by C.M., 
indicating that her testimony had been coerced and coached, did not support 
Mr. Melton's claim that his post-conviction counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. 
(See Respondent's Brief, pp.21-22.) Those letters, even if they have not yet been 
proven to have been in post-conviction counsel's possession at the time of Mr. Melton's 
evidentiary hearing, support Mr. Melton's contention that post-conviction counsel knew 
or should have known that there was additional evidence out there which, if accepted by 
the district court, would have provided a basis for post-conviction relief. Thus, those 
letters, taken in conjunction with Mr. Melton's own sworn statements, are sufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Melton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his Successive Petition and remand his case with an instruction 
that counsel be appointed and that the district court conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 2 ~ ' ~  day of April, 2008. .. . -7 
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